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Questions Presented 
I. Whether the Yuma Indian Nation (the “Nation” or “YIN”) courts have 
jurisdiction over Thomas Smith and Carol Smith (collectively, “the 
Smiths”), non-members of the Nation, where such jurisdiction is beyond 
protecting the Nation’s self-government and control over internal relations, 
or in the alternative, whether the trial court should stay the suit to let the 
Arizona federal district court decide the issue. 
II. Whether the Nation waived its sovereign immunity from suit when its 
contracts with the Smiths expressly provide for “any and all disputes arising 
from the contract to be litigated in a court of competent jurisdiction,” and 
                                                                                                             
 * This brief has been edited from its original form for ease of reading. The record for 
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thus, waived the sovereign immunity of the Nation Economic Development 
Corporation (the “EDC”) and the EDC Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) 
and Accountant. 
Statement of the Case 
I. Statement of the Facts 
This appeal arises out of the Yuma Indian Nation’s improper assertion of 
jurisdiction over Thomas Smith and Carol Smith (collectively, “the 
Smiths”), non-members of the Yuma Indian Nation (the “Nation” or 
“YIN”).  The Nation, the YIN Economic Development Corporation (the 
“EDC”), and EDC Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and Accountant 
expressly waived their sovereign immunity when they entered into a 
contract with Thomas Smith. 
The Nation is a tribal corporation organized under Section 17 of the 
Indian Reorganization Act (“IRA”), former 25 U.S.C. § 477.  In 2007, the 
Nation entered into a contract with Thomas Smith (the “Thomas Contract”) 
that expressly provided that “any and all disputes arising from the contract 
[are] to be litigated in a court of competent jurisdiction.”  Record on Appeal 
(“ROA”) at ¶ 1.  The Thomas Contract provided for Thomas’s advice with 
financial matters on an as-needed basis regarding economic development 
issues.  Id.  In his work, Thomas exchanged emails and telephone calls with 
members of the Tribal Council, EDC CEO Fred Captain (“Captain”), and 
EDC employee and Accountant Molly Bluejacket (“Bluejacket”).  Id. at ¶ 2.  
Thomas additionally prepared and submitted written quarterly reports to the 
Nation Tribal Council and presented his reports in person at Council 
meetings on the reservation.  Id. 
In 2010, with written permission from the Tribal Council, Thomas 
entered into a contract with his sister, Carol Smith (“Carol”), who lives and 
works in Portland, Oregon.  Id. at ¶ 6.  The contract between Thomas and 
Carol provides for compliance with the Thomas Contract.  Id. Carol was 
retained by Thomas to give her brother, the EDC, and the Nation advice 
regarding stocks, bonds, and securities issues.  Id.  Carol has only visited 
the Nation reservation on two occasions, while on vacation in Phoenix.  Id. 
at ¶ 7.  Carol provides direct advice to Thomas exclusively via email, 
telephone, and postal and delivery services.  Id.  Thomas sometimes 
forwards Carol’s emails to both Captain and Bluejacket.  Id. 
The EDC was created by the Nation under the authority of a 2009 tribal 
corporations code as a wholly-owned subsidiary.  ROA at ¶ 3.  In the 
corporate charter, the Nation mandated that the EDC, its board, and all 
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employees be protected by tribal sovereign immunity to the fullest extent of 
the law.  Id. at ¶ 5.  The purpose of such protection for the EDC is to shield 
it from unconsented litigation and to assist in the success of the EDC’s 
endeavors.  Id. at ¶ 5.  The EDC’s primary purpose is “to create and assist 
in the development of successful economic endeavors, of any legal type or 
business, on the reservation and in southwestern Arizona.”  Id. at ¶ 3 
(emphasis added).  Unfortunately, the EDC has not had much economic 
success.  Since its formation in 2009, the EDC has employed an average of 
25 employees each year.  Id. at ¶ 5.  Further, the EDC has only generated 
enough revenue in almost nine years to repay $2 million of the $10 million 
loan from the Nation to fund the EDC, despite a mandate that the EDC 
must pay 50% of its profits to the Nation general fund on an annual basis.  
Id. at ¶ 4.  The EDC has also, contrary to its stated purpose, sought to make 
marijuana cultivation and use on the reservation legal for any and all 
purposes, contrary to Arizona state law.  Id. at ¶ 8.  Although Arizona state 
law allows marijuana use for medical purposes, a state-wide referendum to 
permit marijuana for recreational use failed.  Id.  
The board of directors of the EDC must consist of five individuals, all of 
whom are experienced in business.  ROA at ¶ 3.  The inaugural board of 
directors was selected by the Tribal Council, but directors thereafter are 
either reelected or replaced by a majority of the directors.  Id.  At all times, 
three of the directors must be tribal citizens and two may be non-Indians or 
citizens of other tribes.  Id.  At this time, it is unknown what the makeup of 
the directors is.  See generally ROA.  The Tribal Council retains the 
authority to remove any director for cause, or no cause, by a 75% vote.  Id. 
at ¶ 3. 
Thomas, disagreeing with the Nation and EDC’s endeavor to pursue the 
illegal cultivation of marijuana for any and all purposes, informed his 
acquaintance, the Arizona Attorney General, of the Nation’s plans.  Id. at ¶ 
8.  As a result, the Arizona Attorney General wrote the Nation and EDC a 
cease and desist letter regarding the development of its recreational 
marijuana operations.  Id. 
II. Statement of the Proceedings 
The Nation Tribal Council filed suit against the Smiths in the Nation’s 
tribal court for breach of contract and violation of fiduciary duties and 
confidentiality.  ROA at ¶ 9.  The Nation sought recovery of liquidated 
damages set out in the Smiths’ contracts.  Id.  The Smiths filed special 
appearances and identical Motions to Dismiss based on the tribal court’s 
lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction over them and the suit, or in 
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the alternative, for the trial court to stay the suit while the Smiths pursue a 
ruling from the Arizona United States District Court as to whether the tribal 
court has jurisdiction over the Smiths.  Id. at ¶ 10.  The trial court denied 
both Motions.  Id. 
The Smiths, continuing their special appearances, then filed answers 
denying the Nation’s claims and filed counterclaims against the Nation for 
breach of contract and defamation.  Id. at ¶ 11.  Additionally, and in 
accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure adopted in 2005 by the Tribal 
Council, the Smiths impleaded the EDC and the EDC’s CEO and 
Accountant in their official and individual capacities, for breach of contract 
and defamation.  Id. at ¶ 12.  The trial court dismissed the Smiths’ 
counterclaims against the Nation and third-party claims against the EDC, 
Captain, and Bluejacket alleging sovereign immunity.  Id. at ¶ 13.  The 
Smiths subsequently sought this interlocutory appeal requesting that this 
Court decide the questions presented and issue a writ of mandamus 
ordering the trial court to stay the suit.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
Summary of Argument 
The trial court erred in dismissing for lack of personal and subject matter 
jurisdiction because tribal courts may only exercise jurisdiction over 
members of their tribe for the purpose of protecting the tribe’s self-
government and control over internal relations.  Further, the Smiths did not 
create a consensual agreement or arrangement, nor has the Smiths’ conduct 
been such that the political integrity or economic security of the tribe has 
been threatened. 
Alternatively, this Court should stay the suit while the Smiths seek a 
ruling in Arizona federal district court because the federal court retains the 
ability to determine a tribal court’s jurisdictional power since the Smiths’ 
have exhausted any and all tribal remedies in deference to the tribal court’s 
ability to create laws and self-govern. 
The trial court erred in dismissing the Smiths’ counterclaims against the 
Nation because the Nation expressly waived sovereign immunity from suit 
in its contracts with the Smiths.  The clear and unequivocal waiver 
contained in the Thomas Contract constitutes a waiver of sovereign 
immunity under well-established precedent.  Further, public policy requires 
that sovereign immunity cannot extend to contracts like the Thomas 
Contract, off-reservation commercial contracts. 
Additionally, the trial court erred in dismissing the Smiths’ third-party 
claims against the EDC and Captain and Bluejacket.  First, the Nation 
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waived its sovereign immunity, effectively waiving the EDC’s sovereign 
immunity.  Second, the EDC is not an arm of the tribe, but rather a separate 
business entity.  The sovereign immunity doctrine as it relates to arms-of-
the-tribe is a doctrine of substance rather than form.  Under a factorial test 
that considers creation of the EDC, intent of sovereign immunity extending 
to the EDC, the purpose of the EDC, control of the Nation over the EDC, 
and the financial relationship between the Nation and the EDC, this Court 
must hold that the EDC is not an arm of the tribe.  Further, because the 
EDC is not an arm of the tribe, Captain and Bluejacket, as EDC board 
members and employees, are not afforded protection by sovereign 
immunity. 
Argument 
I. The Nation Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction over the Smiths Because 
Such Jurisdiction Is Beyond Protecting the Tribe’s Self-Government and 
Control over Internal Relations. 
The general rule is that tribes lack civil jurisdiction over non-members.  
See Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 7.03 (2017).  Tribal 
jurisdiction confers power to tribes for the purpose of protecting tribal self-
government or to control internal relations.  Montana v. United States, 450 
U.S. 544, 564 (1981).  To exercise that jurisdiction beyond those two 
functions is contrary to the recognized sovereign dependent status of tribes 
on the federal government, and therefore is only permitted with express 
congressional delegation.  Id.  Therefore, exercising jurisdiction over the 
Smiths, non-members of the Nation, would exceed the tribe’s power 
because their relationship with the Smiths does not pertain to protecting 
tribal self-government, nor does it pertain to internal relations control. 
Before ceding their lands to the United States, Indian tribes exercised 
complete sovereignty over their territory regardless of the citizenship of 
people within their territory.  Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe 
of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 851 (1985); see Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 
(1990) (A basic attribute of full territorial sovereignty is the power to 
enforce laws against all who come within the sovereign's territory, whether 
citizens or aliens. Oliphant [v. Suquamish Indian Tribe] recognized that 
tribes can no longer be described as sovereigns in this sense.).  Tribes ceded 
“their lands to the United States and announc[ed] their dependence on the 
Federal Government that much of their sovereign authority was abdicated.”  
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).  
Specifically, “[t]he areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty 
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has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations between an 
Indian tribe and non-members of the tribe.”  United States v. Wheeler, 435 
U.S. 313, 326 (1978). 
Montana established the general proposition for tribal civil jurisdiction 
that “inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the 
activities of non-members of the tribe.”  Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.  This 
alone should suffice as to why the Smiths are outside the jurisdiction of the 
tribal court as non-members of the Nation.  However, the Supreme Court 
does acknowledge two exceptions to Montana: “(1) when non-members 
‘enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through 
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements’ or (2) when a 
non-member's ‘conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”’”  A-
1 Contractors v. Strate, 520 U.S. 438, 441 (1997) (citing Montana, 450 
U.S. at  566). 
A. The Relationship Between the Smiths and the Nation Lacks a 
Sufficient Nexus to Be Considered a Consensual Relationship Upon 
Which the Tribe Can Exercise Jurisdiction. 
The first Montana exception grants tribal jurisdiction over non-members 
when non-members “enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
member, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements.”  450 U.S. at 565.  Relying on the principles in Oliphant, the 
Supreme Court in Montana stressed that Indian tribes can only exercise 
power consistent with their diminished status as sovereigns and “that the 
Indian tribes have lost any ‘right of governing every person within their 
limits except themselves,”’ thereby defining and justifying the exception.  
Id. (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 147 (1810)).  However, Indian 
tribes do possess some civil jurisdiction over non-members in the form of 
this exception. Id. 
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, the Court found hotel guests could 
not be subject to a tax imposed by the Tribe, holding that “Montana’s 
consensual relationship exception requires that the tax or regulation 
imposed by the Indian tribe have a nexus to the consensual relationship 
itself,” meaning that “a non-member’s consensual relationship in one area 
does not trigger tribal civil authority in another—it is not in for a penny, in 
for a Pound.”  532 U.S. 645, 656 (2001) (quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Additionally, in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, a defendant contractor 
sought a declaratory judgment that a tribal court lacked jurisdiction to 
adjudicate claims of a non-Indian driver for injuries arising out of an 
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automobile accident on a state highway that ran through reservation land.  
520 U.S. at 443.  The Supreme Court found the consensual relationship the 
defendant contractor possessed did not relate to the conduct over which the 
tribe was exercising jurisdiction, and therefore was insufficient to 
demonstrate a consensual nexus.  Id. at 440.  
In this case, the Smiths’ contracts were created to provide financial 
advice regarding the economic development of the Nation.  The EDC’s 
pursuit of developing marijuana operations cannot be considered a 
consensual agreement of the Thomas Contract because that contract 
predates the existence of the EDC.  While the contract between Carol and 
Thomas was created well within the establishment of the EDC, it was 
Thomas’s actions, not Carol’s, which could be seen to have violated the 
contract’s confidentiality agreement.  Therefore, the tribe cannot establish 
that Carol violated her contract’s confidentiality agreement. 
In contrast, in First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Confederated Tribes of Grand 
Ronde Community of Oregon, the district court found that the tribal court 
possessed jurisdiction over a claim based on a contract between the Tribes 
and a non-member investment corporation providing financial and 
investment advice.  No. CIV. 07-05-K1, 2007 WL 3283699, at *1 (D. Or. 
Nov. 2, 2007).  The district court found that a consensual agreement had 
occurred between the non-member investment corporation and the Tribes 
based on a contract agreement signed at the Tribes’ headquarters and the 
hundreds of meetings to the Tribal Council where the corporation’s 
President and CEO provided investment services.  Id. at *4. 
This case stands in stark contrast to First Specialty Ins. Corp. in that, 
unlike the non-member investment corporation, the Smiths never signed an 
agreement on the Nation’s land.  The Thomas Contract was signed in 
Thomas’s office in Phoenix and Carol’s contract was signed presumably in 
Portland or Phoenix.  Thomas also visited the Nation Tribal Council once a 
quarter for ten years, for approximately 40 times to present his quarterly 
reports, unlike the non-member investment corporation executive officer in 
First Specialty Ins. Corp. who visited hundreds of times in the same time 
span.  Id. at *1. 
B. The Smiths’ Conduct Does Not Adequately Threaten or Have a Direct 
Effect on the Political Integrity, the Economic Security, nor the Health 
or Welfare of the Nation as to Imperil Their Subsistence.    
The second Montana exception grants tribal jurisdiction over non-
members when a non-member’s conduct “threatens or has some direct 
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or 
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welfare of the tribe.”  450 U.S. at 566.  This allows tribes to “retain inherent 
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.”  Id. at 565. 
However, the Supreme Court has limited this exception with subsequent 
cases. In Atkinson Trading Co., a non-Indian proprietor of a hotel located 
within the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation brought an action in tribal 
court challenging the Navajo Tribe's authority to impose a tax.  532 U.S. at 
648-49.  After the challenge was rejected by the Navajo Tax Commission 
and the Navajo Supreme Court, the proprietor sought a declaratory 
judgment that the Tribe had no jurisdiction to impose a tax on the non-
Indian proprietor's guests. Id. The Supreme Court articulated that the 
Montana exception:  
[I]s only triggered by nonmember conduct that threatens the 
Indian tribe; it does not broadly permit the exercise of civil 
authority wherever it might be considered “necessary” to self-
government. Thus, unless the drain of the nonmember's conduct 
upon tribal services and resources is so severe that it actually 
“imperil[s]” the political integrity of the Indian tribe, there can 
be no assertion of civil authority beyond tribal lands. 
Id. at 1834 (emphasis in original).  In Plains Commerce Bank v. Long 
Family Land and Cattle Co., a non-Indian bank had sold land it owned on a 
tribal reservation to non-Indians, and the tribal court upheld a jury verdict 
against the bank on a claim of discriminatory lending practices as asserted 
by Indian lessees and their family farming/ranching corporation that the 
bank sought to declare null and void.  554 U.S. 316, 320 (2008).  The 
Supreme Court reversed the tribal court and reiterated the limitation to the 
Montana exception: “The conduct must do more than injure the tribe, it 
must ‘imperil the subsistence’ of the tribal community. One commentator 
has noted that ‘th[e] elevated threshold for application of the second 
Montana exception suggests that tribal power must be necessary to avert 
catastrophic consequences.’” 554 U.S. at 341 (citing Cohen's Handbook of 
Federal Indian Law § 4.02 (2017)). 
The Nation must demonstrate that the cultivation of marijuana is so 
essential to the Nation that the Arizona Attorney General’s cease and desist 
letter regarding the development of recreational marijuana operations was 
catastrophic for tribal self-government.  See Plains Commerce Bank v. 
Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341 (2008).  Much like 
the Court found in Plains Commerce Bank, the Court must find that the 
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cancelled economic endeavor is possibly disappointing but hardly imperils 
the subsistence or welfare of the Nation. See id. 
In contrast, in Attorney's Process and Investigation Services, Inc. v. Sac 
& Fox Tribe of Mississippi in Iowa, the court did uphold a tribal court’s 
jurisdiction over a non-member based on the second Montana exception.  
609 F.3d 927, 946 (8th Cir. 2010).  There, a non-Indian contractor brought 
an action against an Indian tribe, seeking declaratory judgment that the 
tribal court lacked jurisdiction in the tribe's tort action against the company 
and an order compelling arbitration.  Id. at 931.  A tribal leadership dispute 
led to elected leaders hiring the non-member to remove opposition leaders 
from the Tribe’s facilities, which was done with 30 agents carrying batons 
and at least one carrying a firearm.  Id. at 932.  When the Tribe sued the 
non-member in tribal court and the court found for the tribe, the non-
member reopened the case in district court challenging the tribal court’s 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 933.  The Eighth Circuit upheld the tribal court’s 
jurisdiction because the non-member “threatened the tribal community and 
its institutions … [and] political integrity and economic security of the 
Tribe” by attacking the Tribe’s seat of tribal government and the casino 
which serves as the “economic engine” of the Tribe.  Id. at 939.  The court 
found that “[t]his was a direct attack on the heart of tribal sovereignty, the 
right of Indians ‘to protect tribal self-government.’” Id. at 939 (citing 
Montana, 450 U.S. at 564). 
Attorney's Process and Investigation Servs., Inc. differs from the current 
case because there is nothing to demonstrate that the Nation’s tribal 
sovereignty has been threatened by being barred from cultivating 
marijuana. The Smiths presented no physical force against the Tribe. While 
the economic security provided by the development of recreational 
marijuana operations may have provided some benefit to the Tribe, it is not 
clear that it is an “economic engine” upon which the Tribe depends to 
uphold political integrity and tribal self-government.  See 609 F.3d 927, 
939. 
Because tribal courts traditionally do not hold jurisdiction over non-
members and because the Nation cannot satisfy the Montana exceptions of 
non-members entering into a consensual relationship with the tribe or of 
non-member’s conduct imperiling the political integrity and the tribe’s 
survival, the tribal court does not have jurisdiction over the Smiths. 
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C. Alternatively, the Trial Court Should Stay Suit to Allow the Arizona 
Federal District Court to Rule on Tribal Jurisdiction. 
Federal courts possess a “virtually unflagging obligation” to exercise the 
jurisdiction given to them.  Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. U. 
S., 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).  In order for the district court to rule on tribal 
jurisdiction, there must be federal court jurisdiction which is warranted over 
controversies arising within Indian country and involving tribes or their 
members on three bases: (1) a special form of federal question jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 available only to Indian tribes; (2) general federal 
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1331; and (3) diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. § 6:1.  See generally American Indian 
Law Deskbook § 6:1.  Here there is no federal question at issue under 28 
U.S.C. § 1362 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 
civil actions, brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body 
duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in 
controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States.” § 1362. Indian tribes, 28 USCA § 1362.), nor is there a federal 
question issue under 28 U.S.C § 1331. (“The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, 
or treaties of the United States.” § 1331. Federal question, 28 USCA § 
1331.).  At issue, then, is whether diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1332 exists and if the federal government retains the ability to 
review the tribal court’s exercise of jurisdiction. 
To create diversity citizenship, there must be complete diversity in the 
sense that each defendant must be a citizen of a different state relative to 
each plaintiff. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 7.04 (2017). 
However, district courts have found that an “unincorporated Indian tribe is 
not a citizen of any state within the meaning of § 1332(a)(1).”  Am. Vantage 
Cos. v. Table Mt. Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002).  
The Supreme Court in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante held that 
“[t]ribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is 
an important part of tribal sovereignty.” 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).  However, 
the federal court would retain jurisdiction to review the tribal court’s 
jurisdiction to provide proper deference to the tribal court system.  Id. at 19. 
The Smiths are not members of the Nation and tribes are not citizens of 
any state. Therefore, diversity jurisdiction is not immediately apparent.  
However, the Smiths have exhausted their claims in tribal trial court.  This 
would satisfy the Supreme Court’s requirement that district courts do not 
infringe upon tribal courts’ right to make rules and self-govern.  See id. at 
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14.  Therefore, it would be justified to order the trial court to stay the suit 
and allow the Arizona federal district court to determine jurisdiction. 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing the Smiths’ Counterclaims and 
Third-Party Defendant Claims Because the Nation, EDC, and EDC 
Officers Captain and Bluejacket Do Not Enjoy Sovereign Immunity. 
A. The Nation Expressly Waived Sovereign Immunity from Suit in Its 
Contracts with the Smiths. 
Sovereign immunity does not protect the Nation against the Smiths’ 
claims in the instant suit for two reasons.  First, the Nation’s contracts with 
the Smiths provide for an unequivocal and express waiver of the Nation’s 
sovereign immunity.  Second, for serious policy reasons, sovereign 
immunity should not protect the Nation from suit arising from contracts like 
the Smiths’: off-reservation commercial contracts. 
“As a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where 
Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”  
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998); see 
also C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 532 
U.S. 411, 418 (2001).  Congressional abrogation or tribal waiver of 
immunity cannot be implied, but must be unequivocally expressed.  Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (quotations and citations 
omitted).  Here, the record is devoid of any indication that Congress 
intended to abrogate the Nation’s sovereign immunity.  See generally ROA.  
Thus, the question before this Court is whether the Nation expressly waived 
its sovereign immunity. 
The Nation was organized under Section 17 of the Indian Reorganization 
Act (“IRA”), former 25 U.S.C. § 477, that provides for incorporation of a 
tribal business in order to encourage non-Indian businesses to engage in 
commerce with Indian tribes.  25 U.S.C. § 5124 (2012).  Section 17 of the 
IRA is silent as to whether such Section 17 Corporations are inherently 
entitled to sovereign immunity.  See id.  Although not yet decided by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Appellants acknowledge the majority 
holding that the act of incorporation under Section 17 of the IRA in itself 
does not constitute a waiver of the Nation’s sovereign immunity.  See, e.g., 
Memphis Biofuels, LLC v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 
921 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding “that the better reading of Section 17 is that 
it creates ‘arms of the tribe’ that do not automatically forfeit tribal-
sovereign immunity.”); Am. Vantage Cos. v. Table Mt. Rancheria, 292 F.3d 
1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “[a] tribe that elects to incorporate 
does not automatically waive its tribal sovereign immunity by doing so.”) 
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(citations omitted).  However, a Section 17 Corporation may choose to 
expressly waive its sovereign immunity “either in its charter or by 
agreement.”  Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 921.  Although the Nation does 
not automatically waive sovereign immunity as a Section 17 Corporation, 
the Nation expressly waived sovereign immunity through the terms of the 
contracts entered into with the Smiths. 
1. The Nation Expressly Waived Sovereign Immunity in the Thomas 
Contract. 
The Nation expressly relinquished sovereign immunity through the 
Thomas Contract, and thus, is not protected from suit regarding the Smiths’ 
counterclaims.  While waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and 
unequivocal, a tribe “need not use magic words” to explicitly waive 
sovereign immunity.  Narrangasett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, 449 F.3d 
16, 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see also C&L Enters., 532 U.S. at 
420-22 (recognizing that no precedent has ever held that an explicit waiver 
of tribal immunity “must use the words ‘sovereign immunity.’” (quotation 
marks and citation omitted)). 
Similar to the instant case, in C&L Enterprises, Citizen Potawatomi 
Nation entered into an off-reservation commercial contract and expressly 
waived sovereign immunity in the provisions of the contract.  532 U.S. at 
420.  The contract there contained the following arbitration clause: 
All claims or disputes between the Contractor [C & L] and the 
Owner [the Tribe] arising out of or relating to the Contract, or 
the breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration in accordance 
with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association currently in effect unless the 
parties mutually agree otherwise. . .. The award rendered by the 
arbitrator or arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be 
entered upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court 
having jurisdiction thereof. 
Id. at 415 (emphasis added).  The American Arbitration Association Rules 
provided that “[p]arties to these rules shall be deemed to have consented 
that judgment upon the arbitration award may be entered in any federal or 
state court having jurisdiction thereof.”  Id.  Citizen Potawatomi Nation 
argued that it did not waive sovereign immunity because the contract did 
not state a specific judicial forum in which to enforce the arbitration 
decision.  Id. at 421.  However, the Supreme Court rejected that argument, 
holding that the consent to arbitration in the contract unambiguously 
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“memorialize[d] the Tribe’s commitment to adhere to the contract’s dispute 
resolution regime” of the arbitration and choice of law provisions, 
effectuating an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.  Id. at 422.  Other 
courts have subsequently held contractual provisions sufficient to constitute 
waiver of sovereign immunity, without using the words ‘sovereign 
immunity.’  See, e.g., Oglala Sioux Tribe v. C & W Enters., Inc., 532 F.3d 
224, 230 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that “an arbitration clause alone [is] 
sufficient to expressly waive sovereign immunity”); Oneida Indian Nation 
of N.Y. State v. County of Oneida, 802 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417 (N.D.N.Y. 
2011) (holding a retainer agreement that provided for the determination of 
attorney’s fees by “the court or tribunal finally determining” the tribe’s 
claim an express waiver of sovereign immunity). 
In the instant case, and perhaps in an even more explicit waiver of the 
Nation’s sovereign immunity, the Thomas Contract provided that “any and 
all disputes arising from the contract [are] to be litigated in a court of 
competent jurisdiction.”  ROA at ¶ 1.  Like in C&L Enters., the Thomas 
Contract does not state a specific judicial forum in which to litigate disputes 
under it.  Id.; see C&L Enters., 532 U.S. at 421.  However, failure to state a 
judicial forum, as held in C&L Enters., does not invalidate the express 
waiver by the Nation.  532 U.S. at 422.  Further, the clear and unequivocal 
waiver here is distinguished from instances where courts refused to find 
waiver of sovereign immunity.  Cf. Miller v. Wright, 705 F.3d 919, 925 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (holding that a mediation provision in contract that did not 
reference enforcement in any court of competent jurisdiction, coupled with 
an explicit statement providing for the tribe’s retainer of sovereign 
immunity, did not constitute a waiver of such immunity); Allen v. Gold 
Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
employment contract provisions stating that an employee could be 
terminated “for any reason consistent with applicable state or federal law” 
at most might imply a willingness to submit to lawsuits and did not amount 
to waiver of sovereign immunity). 
Accordingly, the Nation expressly waived sovereign immunity when it 
clearly consented to litigation of disputes arising from the Thomas 
Contract.  Thus, the Nation cannot cognizably claim sovereign immunity 
from the Smiths’ counterclaims in this suit. 
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2. Providing Protection for Off-Reservation Commercial Contracts Is 
Contrary to Congress’ Stated Purpose of the Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrine. 
Although the Nation is not protected from suit by sovereign immunity in 
the instant case, sovereign immunity nonetheless should not apply to any 
tribe for disputes arising from off-reservation commercial contracts like the 
one here.  In Kiowa, the Supreme Court of the United States broadly 
extended the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity and held, for the 
first time, that “[t]ribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, whether 
those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and whether 
they were made on or off a reservation.” 523 U.S. at 760.  Despite 
acknowledging that Congress retains plenary power to extend or limit the 
purview of the sovereign immunity doctrine, id. at 758, the Kiowa majority, 
under the guise of congressional deference, expanded the doctrine to protect 
tribes against suits arising from off-reservation commercial contracts.  See 
id. at 765 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
The expansion of the sovereign immunity doctrine by the Kiowa 
majority “is unsupported by any rationale for that doctrine, inconsistent 
with the limits on tribal sovereignty, and an affront to state sovereignty.”  
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2045 (2014) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).  First, the expansion of the doctrine to off-
reservation commercial activities represents a preemption of state power 
because “[w]hen an Indian tribe engages in commercial activity outside its 
own territory, it necessarily acts within the territory of a sovereign State.”  
Id. at 2047.  Therefore, “absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians 
going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to 
nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the 
State.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Second, tribal 
sovereignty is “limited only to what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations.”  Id. at 2048 (quoting Montana, 
450 U.S. at 564) (quotation marks omitted).  The Kiowa majority concedes 
that the expansion of sovereign immunity “extends beyond what is needed 
to safeguard tribal self-governance.”  Id. (quoting Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758).  
Finally, the Kiowa majority’s purported deference to Congress “was a 
fiction and remains an enigma.”  Id. at 2049.  The expansion of sovereign 
immunity to off-reservation commercial contracts frustrates the purpose of 
the sovereign immunity doctrine and encroaches on states’ rights.  
Accordingly, the Nation should never have been entitled to sovereign 
immunity for disputes arising from the Thomas Contract.  
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B. The EDC Is Not Protected by Sovereign Immunity Because It Is Not 
an Arm of the Tribe. 
As discussed in Section II.A., supra, this Court should hold that the 
Nation waived sovereign immunity for disputes arising from its contracts 
with the Smiths.  Thus, sovereign immunity does not protect the EDC, 
because the EDC, its board, and all employees are only protected by the 
Nation’s sovereign immunity to the fullest extent by law.  See ROA at ¶ 5; 
People v. Miami Nation Enters., 2 Cal. 5th 222, 250, 385 P.3d 357, 375 
(2016) (noting that “business entities that claim arm-of-the-tribe immunity 
have no inherent immunity of their own.  Instead, they enjoy immunity only 
to the extent their immunity of the tribe . . . is extended to them.”).  
The record reflects that the EDC was created as a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the Nation and as an “arm-of-the-tribe.”  ROA at ¶ 3.  
However, arm-of-the-tribe immunity is not a doctrine of form over 
substance.  See People v. Miami Nation Enters., 2 Cal. 5th 222, 250, 386 
P.3d 357, 375 (2016).  Following the California Supreme Court’s factorial 
test adopted in Miami Nation, this Court must hold that the EDC is not an 
arm of the tribe, and therefore is not entitled to the Nation’s sovereign 
immunity because the EDC’s actual activities are too far attenuated to be 
properly deemed those of the tribe.   
The Miami Nation court adopted in part a factorial test first articulated 
by the Tenth Circuit in Breakthrough Mgmt. Group, Inc. v. Chukchansi 
Gold Casino Resort, 629 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2010) that considered five 
factors in determining whether a business entity is entitled to tribal 
sovereign immunity: method of creation, tribal intent, purpose, control, and 
financial relationships.  Id. at 245-48, 386 P.3d 372-74 (choosing not to 
adopt the sixth factor of the Breakthrough court’s test because it “overlaps 
significantly with [the] other factors”).  No single factor is universally 
dispositive, and the Miami Nation court held that the lower court erred in 
giving formal considerations, those focusing on the relevance of a formal 
relationship between a tribe and business entity, “inordinate weight.”  Id. at 
250, 386 P.3d at 374-75.  “The ultimate purpose of the inquiry is to 
determine whether the entity acts as an arm of the tribe so that its activities 
are properly deemed to be those of the tribe.”  Id. (emphasis in original) 
(citing Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
1. The EDC’s Method of Creation and Tribal Intent in Forming the EDC 
Are Formal Considerations That Favor Immunity. 
Typically, the formation of a business entity under tribal law favors 
immunity, while formation under state law weighs against immunity.  
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Miami Nation, 2 Cal. 5th at 245-46, 386 P.3d at 372; see also 
Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1187 (holding business entity formed under 
tribal law and tribal constitution sufficient to favor immunity); Am. Prop. 
Mgmt. Corp. v. Superior Court, 206 Cal. App. 4th 491, 503 (2012) (noting 
that a business entity formed as a California LLC is not entitled to 
sovereign immunity).  Like in Miami Nation, the formation of the EDC and 
the Nation’s stated intent regarding the formation of the EDC suggest 
sovereign immunity is proper.  Here, the EDC was created via a corporate 
charter under a 2009 tribal commercial code.  ROA at ¶ 3; see Miami 
Nation, 2 Cal. 5th at 252, 386 P.3d at 376.   
Similarly, where tribal articles of incorporation or ordinances express 
tribal intent to extend its sovereign immunity to a business entity, intent 
favors immunity.  Miami Nation, 2 Cal. 5th at 246, 386 P.3d at 372.  Here, 
the EDC’s charter states that “the EDC, its board, and all employees are 
protected by tribal sovereign immunity to the fullest extent of the law.”  
ROA at ¶ 5; see Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1193.  The purpose of such 
protection for the EDC is to shield it from unconsented litigation and to 
assist in the success of the EDC’s endeavors.  ROA at ¶ 5.  The purpose of 
such protection in the instant case, although frustrated through the Nation’s 
own initiation of suit and waiver of sovereign immunity, is not relevant 
here.  Accordingly, both formation of the EDC and the Nation’s explicit 
intent to extend sovereign immunity to the EDC favor immunity.  However, 
the remaining three factors of Miami Nation do not warrant extension of 
sovereign immunity to the EDC as an arm of the tribe. 
2. Although the Stated Purpose of the EDC Favors Immunity, the 
Realities of the EDC’s Actions Do Not Favor Immunity. 
Although the stated purpose of the EDC favors sovereign immunity, the 
actual purpose carried out in the EDC’s activities does not reflect the 
Nation’s stated purpose and thus weighs against sovereign immunity.  The 
purpose factor “encompasses both the stated purpose for which the entity 
was created and the degree to which the entity actually serves that 
purpose.”  Miami Nation, 2 Cal. 5th at 246, 386 P.3d at 372.  According to 
its charter, the EDC’s primary purpose is “to create and assist in the 
development of successful economic endeavors, of any legal type or 
business, on the reservation and in southwestern Arizona.”  ROA at ¶ 3 
(emphasis added).  Here, the EDC’s lack of economic success is indicative 
that it does not carry out its stated purpose.  First, the EDC has only 
employed an average of 25 tribal members per year since 2009.  Id. at ¶ 5; 
see Miami Nation, 2 Cal. 5th at 247, 386 P.3d at 373 (noting that an entity 
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may bolster its case for immunity by proving the number of jobs it creates 
for tribal members).  Second, the EDC has not generated enough revenue in 
almost nine years to repay the Nation’s $10 million loan that funded the 
EDC in 2009.  Id. at ¶¶ 3, 4.  The EDC has only repaid the Nation $2 
million.  Id. at ¶ 4; see Miami Nation, 2 Cal. 5th at 247, 386 P.3d at 373 
(noting that an entity may bolster its case for immunity by proving the 
amount of revenue it generates for the tribe).  Finally, the EDC has, 
contrary to its stated purpose, endeavored to make marijuana cultivation 
and use on the reservation legal for any and all purposes, contrary to 
Arizona state law.  ROA at ¶ 8.  Accordingly, although the stated purpose 
of the EDC favors extension of the Nation’s sovereign immunity, the reality 
of the EDC’s business activities since its inception does not reflect an 
extension of such immunity. 
3. Although the Nation Purports to Exercise Control over the EDC 
Through the Structure of the EDC, Evidence Suggests That the Nation 
Does Not Exercise Operational Control over the EDC. 
The EDC’s structure suggests that the Nation exerts some sort of control 
over the business entity.  The board of directors of the EDC must consist of 
five individuals, all of whom are experienced in business.  ROA at ¶ 3.  The 
inaugural board of directors was selected by the Tribal Council, but 
directors thereafter are either reelected or replaced by a majority of the 
directors.  Id.  At all times, three of the directors must be tribal citizens and 
two may be non-Indians or citizens of other tribes.  Id.  At this time, it is 
unknown what the makeup of the directors is.  See generally ROA.  The 
Tribal Council retains the authority to remove any director for cause, or no 
cause, by a 75% vote.  Id. at ¶ 3. 
Notwithstanding these formal arrangements, evidence suggests that the 
Nation does not maintain operational control over the EDC.  The record is 
devoid of evidence that points to the Nation’s involvement in the EDC’s 
day-to-day operations.  See generally ROA.  Instead, Thomas, a non-Indian, 
has substantial day-to-day interactions with Captain and Bluejacket, 
director and employee of the EDC.  Id. at ¶ 2.  The EDC is suffering 
economically, contrary to its stated purpose, and has failed to generate 
substantial revenues for the Nation.  ROA at ¶ 4.  The EDC has only repaid 
the Nation $2 million of the $10 million loan given to the EDC in 2009.  Id.  
Further, the record does not indicate that the day-to-day management is 
controlled by the Nation.  See generally ROA; Am. Prop. Mgmt., 206 Cal. 
App. 4th at 505 (indicating that “indirect ownership and control of the tribal 
corporation” weighs against a finding of immunity).  Although the decision 
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to outsource two of the five directors to non-Indians or non-Nation 
members and the advice of the Smiths, non-Indians, is not alone enough to 
tilt this factor against immunity, the lack of operational oversight by the 
Nation favors a finding against immunity.  See Miami Nation, Cal. 5th at 
252, 386 P.3d at 376 (holding that significant evidence suggests that the 
Indian tribes did not maintain operational control over the underlying 
businesses).  
4. The Realities of the Financial Relationship Between the Nation and 
EDC Indicate That Sovereign Immunity Should Not Extend to the EDC.  
The financial relationship between the Nation and EDC clearly show that 
the extension of the Nation’s sovereign immunity to the EDC is 
inappropriate for two reasons.  First, the allocation of 50% of the EDC’s 
revenue to the Nation’s general fund does not support immunity.  Cf. 
Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1192-93 (favoring immunity where 100% of a 
casino’s revenue went to the tribe, 50% going to government functions and 
15% to tribal economic development).  The Nation, as a Section 17 
Corporation, in itself is an economic subsidiary of the Tribe and there is no 
indication that the EDC serves any government function.  See generally 
ROA.  Second, and unlike in Breakthrough, the Nation does not depend 
heavily on the EDC to fund other government functions and support other 
economic development ventures.  Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1195.  Instead, 
the EDC currently indebts the Nation $8 million and has not had much 
success since its inception nearly nine years ago.  Accordingly, the lack of 
financial relationship between the Nation and the EDC in this case weighs 
against sovereign immunity for the EDC as an arm of the tribe.  
With respect to three of the five Miami Nation factorspurpose, control, 
and financial relationshipthe evidence does not suggest that immunity of 
the EDC would “serve to meaningfully promote tribal economic 
development, cultural autonomy, or self-governance, i.e., the purposes of 
sovereign immunity.”  Miami Nation, 2 Cal. 5th at 255, 386 P.3d at 378.  
Although the origination of the EDC appears to favor immunity, through 
tribal intent and method of creation, both factors “reveal[ ] little about 
whether the entity acts as an arm of the tribe so that its activities are 
properly deemed to be those of the tribe.”  Id. at 256, 386 P.3d at 378 
(emphasis in original).  Accordingly, this Court must hold that the trial 
court improperly extended tribal sovereign immunity to the EDC, as it is 
not an arm of the tribe, but rather a separate business entity. 
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C. Captain and Bluejacket Do Not Enjoy Sovereign Immunity from the 
Smiths’ Claims Because the EDC Is Not an Arm of the Tribe.  
As discussed in Section II.B. supra, the EDC is not an arm of the tribe 
and does not enjoy sovereign immunity.  Similarly, Captain and Bluejacket, 
as CEO and Accountant of the EDC respectively, do not enjoy sovereign 
immunity from the Smiths’ claims against them.  Accordingly, this Court 
must hold that the Nation, the EDC, EDC CEO, and Accountant do not 
enjoy sovereign immunity against the Smiths’ claims. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants Thomas and Carol Smith 
respectfully request that this Court hold that the trial court erred in asserting 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the Smiths and erred in 
dismissing the Smiths’ counterclaims and cross-claims due to sovereign 
immunity. 
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